The Visibility of the Invisible: the Vision of Space from Nicholas of Cusa to Alfred Hitchcock by Hoff, Johannes
1 
 
 
 
 
THE VISIBILITY OF THE INVISIBLE 
FROM NICHOLAS OF CUSA TO LATE-MODERNITY AND BEYOND1 
Johannes Hoff 
Our modern understanding of science and culture builds on two key concepts: a concept 
of subjective ‘autonomy’ that suggests that everyone is by nature able to ‘determine’ 
herself; and a representationalist concept of space that suggests that the world we 
inhabit can be exhaustively represented by a mathematically generated ‘picture of the 
world’, for example as in a computer generated 3D animation. The theoretical 
formulation of these concepts can be traced back to Descartes’ Discourse on Method, 
which was published together with his Optics and Geometry in 1637.2 However, both 
                                                 
 
1  The following essay builds on material of my forthcoming book, Johannes Hoff, The Analogical 
Turn. Re-thinking Modernity with Nicholas of Cusa (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 2013). Quotations of 
Cusa’s writings are based on the critical edition of his works (h) in: Nicolai de Cusa, Opera omnia, iussu 
et auctoritate Academiae Litterarum Heidelbergensis ad codicum fidem edita (Leipzig-Hamburg, 
1932ff.). Unless otherwise indicated, English translations are based on: Nicholas of Cusa, Complete 
Philosophical and Theological Treatises of Nicholas of Cusa. Transl. by Jasper Hopkins (Minneapolis: 
Arthur Banning Press 2001). The numbering system is based on the above critical edition (h) which is 
meanwhile also electronically available, including a selection of German translations, and the above 
Hopkins translation (http://www.cusanus-portal.de/). Deviations in the numbering system of the translated 
text are indicated as “Hp”. References in the main text refer to De visione Dei. 
2  René Descartes, Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, and Meteorology. Translated, with an 
introduction, by Paul J. Olscamp (Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett 2001). 
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concepts had rapidly emerged 200 years earlier after architect Filippo Brunelleschi’s 
public “demonstrations” of the linear perspective in Florence in 1425.3  
On the artistic level, these experiments led to the introduction of the virtual reality of 
the modern picture, as well as of TV and of computers and the internet; but they also 
provoked, on the scientific level, the emergence of a digital conceptual space that 
informed philosophers and scientists such as Descartes, Newton and Einstein. Briefly, 
the modern concepts of science and culture were not invented by scientists, but were 
rather the outcome of an artistic vision of space and autonomy. This explains why the 
accompanying vision of scientific realism was successful despite its counter-intuitive 
presuppositions and mathematical flaws.4  
                                                 
 
3  For a genealogical reconstruction of the emergence of these two concepts, cf. part II of my 
forthcoming book (see Fn. 1). As for the ‘visual turn’ in Northern Italy after Brunelleschi’s public 
experiments, cf. Hans Belting, Florenz und Bagdad. Eine westöstliche Geschichte des Blicks (München: 
C.H. Beck 2008) (transl. Hans Belting, Florence and Baghdad. Renaissance Art and Arab Science 
(Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2011)); and Samuel Y. Edgerton, The 
Mirror, the Window, and the Telescope. How Renaissance Linear Perspective Changed our Vision of the 
Universe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2009). 
4  These mathematical flaws are related to the modern ‘solution’ of the medieval conundrum of the 
squaring of the circle. I have discussed Cusa’s philosophically more rigorous, apophatic solution to this 
problem in Johannes Hoff, Kontingenz, Berührung, Überschreitung. Zur philosophischen Propädeutik 
christlicher Mystik nach Nikolaus von Kues (Freiburg/Br.: Alber 2007), 84-143. My above genealogy of 
the emergence of the modern concept of autonomy and the related, ‘virtualized’ concept of space builds 
on this research (see Fn. 3). 
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Cusa, Alberti, and the Emergence of the Modern Age 
Leon Battista Alberti provided what is assumed to be the first theoretical account of 
the principles that stood behind Brunelleschi’s groundbreaking experiments in his book 
On painting of 1435.5 But Alberti was less innovative than it is frequently assumed, 
since his mathematical account of the ‘visual turn’ in Florence built heavily on the 
theories of Biagio Pelacani da Parma.  
 
Biagio taught at the University of Padua, and developed a mathematical theory of visual 
space that is almost forgotten today. Nicholas of Cusa was acquainted with Biagio’s 
philosophy from the beginning of his career as a student in Padua in 1417, where he 
attended the lectures of Biagio’s disciple Prosdocimus de’ Beldomandis. It is here that 
Cusa may have first met Alberti. Whatever the case, Cusa certainly made his 
acquaintance later, at the ‘Florentine Stammtisch’6 of his close friend Paolo dal Pozzo 
Toscanelli, at which Brunelleschi was also present. Significant research has been done 
                                                 
 
5  Cf. Leon Battista Alberti, On Painting and On Sculpture. The Latin Texts of De pictura and De 
statua. Ed. by Cecil Grayson (London: 1972). For an English translation, cf. Leon Battista Alberti, On 
Painting. Transl. by Cecil Grayson, with an introduction and notes by Martin Kemp (London: Penguin 
1991). 
6  Tom Müller, Perspektivität und Unendlichkeit. Mathematik und ihre Anwendung in der 
Frührenaissance am Beispiel von Alberti und Cusanus (Regensburg: Roderer-Verlag 2011), 15-33. The 
German term “Stammtisch” defies translation. One of my Lampeter students arguably translated it as 
follows: ‘A Stammtisch is a table in the pub were people meet in order to discuss “the big questions”.’ 
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on this connection in the last years.7 What has been traditionally played down, however, 
and only recently attracted the attention of Cusa scholars, is the fact that Cusa did not at 
all agree with the theories of his Stammtisch-friends – this despite the notorious 
‘modern’ features of his philosophy.8 
 
Already in his first philosophical book, De docta ignorantia (1440-42), we see Cusa 
developing a philosophically more rigorous account of the early modern 
mathematisation of space, one that avoids the mathematical simplifications of Alberti. 
In fact this account displays amazing similarities to the alternative liturgical vision of 
space contained in the North Burgundian paintings by artists such as Jan van Eyck.9 
                                                 
 
7  For the following, see particularly Harald Schwaetzer; Wolfgang Schneider et al., 'Videre et 
videri coincidunt'. Theorien des Sehens in der ersten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts (Münster: Aschendorff 
2010). 
8  Cf. Gianluca Cuozzo, "Bild, visio und Perspective. Cusanus und L.B. Alberti". In: Inigo Bocken; 
Harald Schwaetzer (Ed.), Spiegel und Portrait. Zur Bedeutung zweier zentraler Bilder im Denken des 
Nicolaus Cusanus (Maastricht: 2005), 178-196; Karsten Harries, "On the Power and Poverty of 
Perspective. Cusanus and Alberti". In: Peter J. Casarella (Ed.), Cusanus. The legacy of learned ignorance 
(Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press 2006), 105-126. 
9  Cf. Inigo Bocken, "Imitatio und creatio bei Cusanus und Van Eyck. Die neue Bedeutung des 
Betrachters im 15. Jahrhundert". In: Harald Schwaetzer; Wolfgang Schneider; Inigo Bocken; Marc de 
Mey (Ed.), 'Videre et videri coincidunt' (Münster: Aschendorff 2010), 195-208; Luc Bergmans, "Creating 
as the Possest, Painting as I can and Contemplating with Lively Attention. An Interpretation of the Joint 
Venture of Jan Van Eyck and the Viewers of the Ghent Altarpiece". In: Harald Schwaetzer; Wolfgang 
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Even more significant is the little book that Cusa sent to the Monks at the Monastery of 
Tegernsee in 1453, entitled On the vision of God (De visione Dei). This book includes a 
comprehensive deconstruction of Alberti’s concepts of space, perspectivity, and 
subjective autonomy. It anticipated not only latter developments in modern philosophy 
and art such as Paul Cézanne, Alfred Hitchcock, and Jacques Lacan, as we will see 
below; Cusa’s deconstruction of Alberti in fact takes a significant step beyond the 
postmodern, critical stocktaking of the modern age.10 The following essay provides a 
short introduction to the key problems of this text in the light of these late-modern 
developments, focusing particularly on the issues of visibility and invisibility, which at 
their heart are questions that arose in relation to Pseudo-Dionysius’ Mystical Theology.  
1. Cusa’s Experimental Staging of the Modern Perspective 
In 1452 the Monks of Tegernsee put to Cusa the question of how the Mystical Theology 
of Dionysius the Areopagite might be conceived. Cusa’s De visione Dei was his 
response, which took the form of an experimental introduction to the mystical theology 
of his philosophical paragon. For together with his book, he sent to his friends an icon 
that depicts a so-called figura cuncta videns: an ‘all-seeing figure’, whose gaze 
                                                                                                                                               
 
Schneider; Inigo Bocken; Marc de Mey (Ed.), 'Videre et videri coincidunt' (Münster: Aschendorff 2010), 
257-271; Wolfgang Christian Schneider, "Betrachtung, Aufstieg und Ordnung im Genter Altar". In: 
Harald Schwaetzer; Wolfgang Schneider; Inigo Bocken; Marc de Mey (Ed.), 'Videre et videri coincidunt' 
(Münster: Aschendorff 2010), 209-236. 
10 I have provided support for this hypothesis in part III of my forthcoming book (see Fn. 1). 
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simultaneously follows the movements of all its viewers at the same time. The icon 
Cusa used was presumably a so-called ‘Veronica’ – a ‘Veronica’ being a replica of the 
famous vera icona (true icon) which was venerated in Rome. According to the legend, 
this latter icon was identical with the veil onto which the lord had pressed his face on 
the way to Mount Calvary; its name deriving from the woman, ‘Veronica’, who had 
offered her veil to Christ (vera icona – Veronica).  
 
The vera icona Cusa sent to the monks was not an early modern art image but a 
variation of this archetypical cult image, presumably similar to Van Eyck’s portrait style 
versions of this icon.11 (Given the long tradition of scholarly attempts to harmonize 
Cusa and Alberti this fact has significance beyond the field of art-history). Cusa 
instructs the monks to fix this mystic icon to the Northern wall, and to walk past it from 
East to West and also from West to East, while fixing their eyes on its gaze. If the 
monks follow this instruction, they will discover that the gaze follows them at all times 
(Praefatio, n. 4, 6f.). If the monks start talking with each other they will discover 
                                                 
 
11  Hans Belting compares it with Van Eyck’s 1438 icon, which is now displayed in the Staatliche 
Museen Preußischer Kulturbesitz in Berlin. Cf. Belting, Florenz und Bagdad, 240-246. As for the 
distinction between ‘cult image’ (Kultbild) and ‘art image’ (Kunstbild) see Beltings ground breaking 
1990 monograph ‘Bild und Kult’; transl. as Hans Belting, Likeness and Presence. A History of the Image 
before the Era of Art. Transl. by E.F.N. Jephcott (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1994). For a 
thorough investigation of the Western vera icona tradition, see Gerhard Wolf, Schleier und Spiegel. 
Traditionen des Christusbildes und die Bildkonzepte der Renaissance (München: Fink 2002).  
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something more exceptional still: namely that the gaze follows the movements of all 
viewers simultaneously, even when they are moving in opposite directions.  
2. The Coincidence of Vision and Audition 
This leads us to Cusa’s well-known concept of the ‘coincidence of opposites’ 
(coincidentia oppositorum). That the gaze of the all-seeing figure follows individual 
movements might appear ‘impossible’; but this appearance is itself still consistent with 
the law of contradiction. By contrast, the fact that the gaze moves simultaneously in 
opposite directions offends the law of contradiction. Hence it touches on a more 
rigorous ‘impossibility’.  
 
This last point is cardinal for Cusa’s concept of God. The principles of human reason 
require us to distinguish between opposite determinations: if something is moving to the 
right it cannot simultaneously move to the left; a straight line cannot simultaneously be 
a curved line, etc. The principles of rationality require us to demarcate using opposing 
determinations. But to distinguish or to de-fine something is tantamount to conceiving 
something as limited or finite; and this precisely explains why human reason is pushed 
to its limits whenever it tries to conceive the in-finity of God. The concept of God is per 
definitionem incompatible with dialectical distinctions or analytic de-finitions. We 
cannot conceive what a word means when it refers to an infinite reality (pace Georg 
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Cantor’s set theory).12 But we can know reflexively that the infinity reality of God, and 
only this reality, exceeds all relative determinations and oppositions by necessity. We 
are not completely ignorant with regard to God. Rather our ignorance of God possesses 
the character of a docta ignorantia, a knowing unknowing.  
 
In Cusa’s experiment, the introduction of this paradox goes along with a change in the 
medium of experience. Whereas every monk can see that the gaze is following him, the 
discovery that the gaze is doing the same thing with everyone is dependent upon his 
ability to hear. I can never see from my perspective what another might see from hers. 
But I can perceive it, because I have learned to believe what other people have revealed 
to me in words. It is for this same reason that Cusa exhorts his monks to listen and to 
believe: nisi crederet non caperet (“Unless he believed, he would not understand”, n. 
3,22f.; Hp n. 4). 
 
                                                 
 
12  Modern mathematicians might object that the concept of infinity has become definable 
subsequent to Georg Cantor’s concept of “uncountable sets”. However, the standard interpretation of 
Cantor’s infamous “diagonal argument” is not consistent with Cusa’s uncompromising realist use of the 
law of the excluded middle; and it is still possible to interpret Cantor’s argument in accordance with these 
more rigorous principles. Cf. Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, "Zu einer prototheoretischen Begründung der 
klassischen Mengenlehre". In: Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert; et al. (Ed.), Proceedings des Becker-
Kolloquiums "Übungen zur Begründung der Mathematik" (Hagen: 2005); and with regard to Cusa, Hoff, 
Kontingenz, Berührung, Überschreitung, 84-143, and 443f. 
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If I am looking at someone who reveals to me that she is seeing something that I cannot 
see from my own perspective, I am starting to perceive that there is something invisible 
to me. Cusa’s conviction that the invisible is visible is related to this phenomenon. 
Against this backdrop, we start to understand why Cusa appreciated the celebration of 
individuality, perspectivity, and plurality in the Renaissance Era. Only the free-play of 
individual perspectives can make us realize that not only is there always more to be seen 
than we actually see, but the temporarily invisible is simultaneously visible in the social 
space of face-to-face encounters:  
He makes many figures, because the likeness of His infinite power can be unfolded 
in the most perfect way only in many figures. And all intellectual spirits are useful 
to each [intellectual] spirit. […] For each intellectual spirit sees in You-my-God 
something [without] which the others – unless it were revealed to them – could not 
in the best possible manner touch unto You-their-God. ( c. 25 n. 117,1-8; Hp n. 
111) 
3. Alberti’s Account of the Modern Perspective 
Perspectivity, Individuality, Plurality: in appreciating these phenomena as matters of 
ultimate concern, we have already exceeded the threshold of modernity.13 However, as 
the art historian Hans Belting has pointed out, the all-seeing gaze of Cusa’s icon is 
incompatible with the strategy of early modern portrait art which seeks to tie the gaze of 
a portrait to a fixed angle of vision from which it can be appropriated and annexed.14 It 
                                                 
 
13  Cf. also Wolf, Schleier und Spiegel, 201-272. 
14  ‘Er (Cusa) kontrastiert den unendlichen Blick Gottes mit dem endlichen Blick seiner Geschöpfe 
[...]. Das Monopol von Gottes Blick durfte nicht von seinem Betrachter annektiert werden, der seinen 
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is no accident that the genre of portrait art was invented simultaneously with the 
geometrical perspective. For in a certain respect the geometric space of Early 
Renaissance paintings transformed 
every painting into a self-portrait of 
the viewer; or more precisely into a 
narcissistic mirror image.  
 
In the paintings of the 
mathematician Piero della Francesca (1415-1492), for example, we find the most 
striking examples of this new cultural technology of visualisation. Piero used a grid 
floor as a measuring unit, and dissected the bodies placed on this floor as though they 
were pillars, pilasters, columns, plinths, and capitals. At the same time, he oriented this 
scenario to the eye (Z) of the viewer (in the above diagram Z is turned by 90 degrees to 
the left side). The latter was defined as an abstract geometrical point, and corresponded 
to the vanishing point (V) within the image to which the backwards oriented parallel 
lines of the floor converged like receding railroad tracks.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
 
eigenen Blick ikonisch machen wollte. Das war zugleich ein Seitenhieb auf das neue Portrait, das sich 
den frontalen Blick der Ikone angeeignet hat.’ Belting, Florenz und Bagdad, 240.  
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This compositional strategy was consistent with Alberti’s theoretical innovations, which 
introduced the two key concepts of modern science and culture:15 the vanishing lines 
reflect the invisible eye point of the viewer before the painting; and this puts the latter in 
the position of an autonomous observer, who can control the space of his perception as 
if it were nothing but a mirror image of his subjective position.  
 
Our gaze is no longer exterior to these paintings, as the eye point in the above 
illustration demonstrates. On the one hand, the eye point (Z) functions as a variable that 
can be occupied by every single viewer, starting with the painter; on the other hand this 
point becomes visible in the virtual space of the image, since it is reflected by the 
vanishing point (V) at the horizon.  
 
The last point explains why the invention of the modern concept of space coincided 
with the invention of the modern concept of autonomy: the principles of the geometrical 
perspective require me to adopt a fixed position in relation to the physical frame of the 
painting; but this ‘real-time scenario’ is only required in order to ensure that my real 
position coincides with my illusionary position as an eye point in the virtual space of the 
image. As soon as I have got this right, the embodied space of my real world fades into 
                                                 
 
15  For a concise introduction to Alberti’s construction of the perspective, cf. Karsten Harries, 
Infinity and Perspective (Cambridge: 2001), 72-75; the following interpretation of the central perspective 
is indebted to the above monograph of Belting (see Fn. 3). 
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the background, like the LG label at the bottom of my television screen. As soon as the 
viewer ‘immerses’ himself in the virtual space of the image, the real world of his body 
evaporates like the vanishing point that mirrors his disembodied eye point in the 
illusionary world of the painting.  
4. Narcissus and the Emergence of the Modern “Virtual Space” 
Alberti himself explicitly pointed out that this new imaginary world coincides with 
the world of Narcissus: the new art of painting enables the painter to ‘embrace’ 
(amplectere) the surface of Narcissus’ pool: ‘What is painting but the act 
of embracing by the means of art the surface of the pool.’16 As such, Alberti offers a 
new understanding for Narcissus’s act of falling in love with himself, and in doing so 
presents a challenge to traditional understandings of his action. 
 
According to the mythological tradition, Narcissus fell in love with his mirror image, 
and became engulfed by its elusiveness. As Philostratus the Elder expressed in his 
description of various artworks of antiquity, he ‘does not hear anything we say, but he is 
                                                 
 
16  Quid est enim aliud pingere quam arte superficiem illam fontis amplecti? Alberti, On Painting, n 
26; cf. also, Claus-Artur Scheier, "Albertis Narziß und der 'Cartesianismus' von 'De pictura'". In: Harald 
Schwaetzer; Wolfgang Schneider; Inigo Bocken; Marc de Mey (Ed.), 'Videre et videri coincidunt' 
(Münster: Aschendorff 2010), 67-80, 79.  
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immersed eyes and ears alike, in the water.’17 In the face of this mythological imagery, 
mirrors were perceived as deceptive and dangerous: as distinct from the real encounter 
with living bodies, the mirroring of images was associated with the incorporeal and 
fugitive shadow world of death.18 
 
A new appreciation of mirrors in the Early Renaissance was partly due to the increasing 
distribution of concave mirrors that improved their reflective qualities. However, 
Alberti’s claim to have solved the dilemma of Narcissus was not based on empirical 
observations. It rather celebrated the new mathematical concept of space: Narcissus has 
no longer any reason to be afraid of his mirror image, since the new geometrical art of 
painting enables him to adopt a position that keeps the elusiveness of optical reflexions 
under control. Similar to Narcissus, who forgot that he was watching nothing but his 
own mirror image, the new brand of paintings makes us forget that their deceptively 
                                                 
 
17  Philostratus; Philostratus et al., Imagines. With an English transl. by Arthur Fairbanks (London: 
William Heinemann 1931), I 23 (accessed via http://www.theoi.com/Text/PhilostratusElder1A.html); cf. 
also Wolf, Schleier und Spiegel, 216. 
18  This is the background to an almost forgotten episode of Dante’s Inferno where the poets Dante 
and Virgil encounter, in the circle of fraud, two thirsty sinners that vainly ‚lick the Mirror of Narcissus’. 
Cf. Dante Alighieri, La Divina Commedia. Ed. by G. Petrocchi (Milan: Mondadori 1966), Inferno XXX, 
and Paradiso III; transl. accessed in: http://etcweb.princeton.edu/dante/pdp/. For the following, cf. Wolf, 
Schleier und Spiegel, 212-243; and Belting, Florenz und Bagdad, 246-53. 
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realistic appearance is linked to a physical medium.19 But to indulge in this narcissistic 
habit is for Alberti and his artistic successors no longer dangerous, since the viewer’s 
attitude to his imaginary mirror has become frozen. Hence, by redefining the image as a 
window that cuts through the visual pyramid, the new generation of artists also created a 
‘cut through the temporal pyramid’ (Schnitt durch die Zeitpyramide):20 The 
uncontrollable temporality of bodily encounters was arrested and replaced by the 
encounter with an atemporal “virtual reality”.  
 
As Karsten Harris has argued, this counterintuitive concept of artistic realism came 
about for pragmatic reasons. The sacrifice of our everyday realism was the price to be 
paid for a simulacrum that permitted representational security.21 Similar to Ulysses, who 
let himself be tied to the mast of his ship so that he could listen to the deceptive sounds 
of the Sirens without getting lured by their mortal attraction, the viewer is required to 
suppress his natural inclination to act if he wants to enjoy the narcissistic achievements 
of the time to come – though it arguably took more than three further centuries of 
                                                 
 
19  Cf. Sylvie Tritz, "Ad imaginem et similitudinem. Bildtheologie, Malereitheorie und Kunstpraxis 
zur Zeit des Nikolaus von Kues". In: Inigo Bocken; Harald Schwaetzer (Ed.), Spiegel und Portrait. Zur 
Bedeutung zweier zentraler Bilder im Denken des Nicolaus Cusanus (Maastricht: Uitgeverij 2005), 197-
216, 206. 
20  Wolf, Schleier und Spiegel, 252. 
21  Cf. Harries, Infinity and Perspective, 76-83. 
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habituation with the ties of perspective art before we became able to enjoy virtualized 
violence without giving way to our responsive inclination to act.22 
5. Liturgical vs. Virtual Spaces 
As pointed out above, the new art of painting that arose in the Early Renaissance in 
North Italy was not designed to afford actions which responded to a real time 
environment. It was designed to suppress the temporality of human perception based on 
a technology that obliterated any sign of actuality at the screen of the painting; our 
perception of space became focused on virtual realities. 
 
This is the reason why Alberti rejected, other than Van Eyck and Cusa, the gold 
background paintings of the Gothic tradition. Alberti had no objections against the use 
of ‘massive gold’ as long as he was talking about, what Immanuel Kant later called the 
par-ergon (“accessory work”) of a painting. But when it came to the ergon (the “proper 
work of art”)23 he criticized even the use of gold with regard to golden objects.24 If a 
                                                 
 
22  Cf. John Milbank, Being reconciled. Ontology and pardon (London: Routledge 2003), 26-43. 
23  Cf. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft. Werke Bd. 5. Hg. von Wilhelm Weischedel 
(Darmstadt: 1957), §14; cf. also Immanuel Kant, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen 
Vernunft. Werke Bd 4. Hg.von Wilhelm Weischedel (Darmstadt: 1956) B62f. For a deconstruction of this 
dualism, cf. Jacques Derrida, Die Wahrheit in der Malerei. Übers. von M. Wetzel (Wien: Passagen-
Verlag 1990), 31-176. 
24  Cf. Alberti, On Painting, II n. 49; see also Wolf, Schleier und Spiegel, 209. 
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painter depicted, for example, the golden belt of Dido he had to make it look as if it 
were golden without using a colour that exposed the painting to the lighting conditions 
of its real time environment. Shimmering effects were desirable in an ontological realist 
tradition that appreciated the tactile presence of paintings in the real space we inhabit. 
They enabled the viewer to immerse him or herself into the depicted drama without 
getting out of touch with her earthly world that recalled her distance to the invisible 
plenitude of God.25 However, the staging of suspense effects between immanence and 
transcendence became unacceptable as soon as the modern, representationalist tradition 
of perspective paintings started to distinguish between the ergon and the par-ergon of 
the painting in order to celebrate the viewer’s unconditioned immersion in the illusory 
world of a virtual space. 
 
As distinct from this new tradition, Cusa’s vera icona did not have the character of art 
image in which the viewer is expected to immerse him or herself. Rather it was 
designed to serve as a liturgical image that can be approached simultaneously from a 
plurality of viewpoints like a sacramental threshold that mediates between the earthly 
liturgical gathering of the church and the fullness of the divine glory without blurring 
                                                 
 
25  The open triptych in the chapel of the St Nikolaus Hospital in Kues, which was build in 
accordance with Cusa’s instructions, provides an excellent example of this mystagogical use of gold. Cf. 
Foerster, Thomas, "Das Passionstriptychon im St. Nikolaus-Hospital von Bernkastel-Kues." In: Cusanus 
Jahrbuch (2011), 55-89, p. 60 Fn. 14. 
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the difference between the human and the divine. In short, Cusa’s icon was designed to 
recover the pre-modern, liturgical concept of space.26 However, Cusa did not simply 
reject the artistic innovations of his time, and this explains why there are also 
similarities between Cusa’s liturgical and Alberti’s narcissistic concept of space. If the 
monks follow Cusa’s instructions, they will discover not only that the icon’s all-seeing 
gaze follows every individual movement; they will also discover that the all-seeing gaze 
can be controlled like a mirror image: God looks at me as if he were subjected to my 
spontaneous movements. Cusa is no longer afraid of mirroring effects like these; he 
even encourages his friends to immerse themselves into the experience of mirroring, 
and celebrates this possibility as a gift of grace that reveals the uniqueness of every 
person.27 
  
This innovative feature of De visione Dei has to be interpreted in the light of Cusa’s 
earlier claim that his writings include ‘previously unheard’ (prius inaudita)28 teachings. 
In the relevant eleventh chapter of De docta ignorantia II Cusa had argued (notably 100 
                                                 
 
26  Already Michel de Certeau has described Cusa’s Tegernsee experiment as a ‘mathematical 
liturgy’ that introduces a social concept of space (cf. Certeau, Michel de, "The Gaze. Nicholas of Cusa." 
In: Diacritics 17.3 (1987), 2-38, 14, and 18ff). I have reconstructed the related ‘liturgical concept of 
space’ in part III of my forthcoming book (see Fn. 1). Cf. also Catherine Pickstock, After Writing. On the 
Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell 1998), 3-46.  
27  Cf. Wolf, Schleier und Spiegel, 262. 
28  De docta ignorantia II, c. 11 n. 156. 
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years before Copernicus) that, in terms of the comparative methods of scientific reason, 
the centre of the universe can be located everywhere: In an infinite sphere every point is 
equidistant to the periphery; hence every point can be its centre.29 De visione dei goes a 
step further in the logic of this ‘unheard teaching’, when in the preface Cusa praises a 
mural of Rogier van der Weyden’s in which the North Burgundy painter had depicted 
himself in the divine position of an ‘all-seeing figure’. As he argues in the following 
chapters, it is a gift of grace that ‘we cannot hate ourselves’; for ‘I ought to love myself 
(diligere debeo)’, and everyone should do so.30 Hence, everyone is justified in following 
the examples of artists like Van der Weyden and Van Eyck by posing in the position of 
God. I am justified in perceiving myself as the centre of the universe! What Sigmund 
Freud called latter ‘primary narcissism’31 is in Cusa’s view, like in Alberti’s, salutary, 
healthy and good. It does not necessarily mark the first step into an illusionary world of 
self-deception: it can also mark the starting point of a mystagogical ascent that leads to 
salvation. 
 
                                                 
 
29  Cf. D. Mahnke, Unendliche Sphäre und Allmittelpunkt. Beiträge zur Genealogie der 
mathematischen Mystik (Halle/Saale: 1937), 77-108; 145-159; and Jean-Michel Counet, Mathématique et 
dialectique chez Nicola de Cues (Paris: 2000), 211-253. 
30  De visione Dei, c. 15 n. 65, 14 and n. 66,5-9 (Hp n. 70); see also c. 6, n. 20.  
31  Cf. Sigmund Freud, On Narcissism: An Introduction. Ed. by J. Sandler, E. Spector Person, P. 
Fonagy (New Haven: Yale University Press 1991). 
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The last point brings us back to the difference between Cusa and Alberti. In contrast to 
Alberti, the immersion in narcissistic images marks in Cusa only the first rung of a 
ladder that leads to the vision of God;32 and this explains why his modernised vera 
icona is ultimately to be used like an archaic ‘cult image’ and not like a modern ‘art 
image’. The second step of Cusa’s mystagogical ascent is crucial for this difference, 
since it requires us to encounter real persons in the real space that we inhabit. Certainly, 
Alberti’s ‘narcissistic’ account of images included a humanist account of interpersonal 
relationships as well. However, unlike with Cusa, this account did not focus on the 
visibility of the invisible in the face of another person. Instead, it focused on my ability 
to put myself in the position of others;33 as if the difference between two perspectives 
could be reduced to the difference between two narcissistic positions that I myself as 
viewer could adopt in a time sequence.  
 
This sequential dimension of Alberti’s concept of intersubjectivity might be illustrated 
by the example of Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa. Art images like these invite me to 
assume the position of Leonardo’s eye point; everyone can enter the queue in the 
Louvre in order to immerse themselves, at least for a short time, in Leonardo’s 
narcissistic world. But the possibility of adopting the position of a dead artist does not 
create a social space for real encounters. The self-enclosed world of modern art images 
                                                 
 
32  Cf. De filiatione dei, c. 3 n. 65-68. 
33  Cf. Alberti, On Painting, II n. 25, and III n. 61-63; and Wolf, Schleier und Spiegel, 248f. 
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leaves space for the interpersonal skills of a humanist ‘ego’ that has learned to immerse 
itself temporarily in the narcissistic world of ‘other egos’, but this leaves no space for 
the emergence of the invisible in real-time encounters. In contrast to Cusa’s common 
sense realism, modern art images tend to replace our pre-reflexive experience of the 
social space by an artificially created ‘egological’34 experience of ‘intersubjective’ 
convertibility. 
6. Eros vs. Mimesis 
Against this background, it might be argued that Alberti’s account of intersubjectivity 
not only anticipated the modern concept of subjective autonomy, but also the 
unmasking of this concept in the philosophy of Descartes’ post-modern successors. This 
becomes particularly evident in Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytic account of the modern 
                                                 
 
34  This critical observation relates to recent phenomenological debates on Husserl’s ‘egological’ 
concept of intersubjectivity which can be traced back to Jacques Derrida’s controversy with Emmanuel 
Lévinas’ on this topic in the 60’s of the last century (cf. Jacques Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics". In: 
Writing and difference (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1978), 79-153). However, as I have argued in 
part III of my forthcoming book with regard to Lévinas and Jean-Luc Marion (see Fn. 1), 
phenomenological methods are insufficient to overcome the representationalist rationality of the post-
Cartesian tradition. Hence, Cusa’s common sense realism has become more relevant than ever before.  
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concept of intersubjectivity in his essay ‘The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function 
of the I’.35 
According to Lacan’s, justifiably36 non-empirical, psychoanalytical account of the 
emergence of ‘intersubjectivity’, our social skills derive from the pleasure of toddlers 
who enjoy imitating their own mirror image. Our ability to talk with other persons is 
accordingly the upshot of a creative act of self-deception: the infant learns to talk with 
other persons and to accommodate acts of joint attention, because it confuses the facial 
expressions and gestures of its mother with the mirror image of its own face that it 
enjoys imitating, like a toddler that imitates its mother while the latter is telephoning 
with its father. 
 
Cusa, by contrast, builds on an Augustinian anthropology, one articulated through a far 
more clearly Medieval heritage. According to this anthropology, the transition from the 
stage of the ‘infant’ (in-fans), that it not yet able to talk (non fari), to the stage of the 
                                                 
 
35  Jacques Lacan, "The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in 
Psychoanalytic Experience". In: Ecrits: A Selection (London: Tavistock Publications 1977), 1-7. 
36  Lacan’s speculative theory aimed to explain how we retroactively imagine the emergence of 
subjective autonomy and intersubjectivity as ‘revealed’ in the therapeufartic experience of 
psychoanalysis. This is consistent with the Kantian assumption that subjectivity is not an empirical fact 
but a condition of the possibility of empirical experiences. For this reason, it would be pointless to 
“disprove” Lacan’s theory, for example based on empirical observations about joint attention in child-
parent dyads.  
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‘boy’ (puer), that is able to talk with and listen to others is provoked by the desire of its 
heart. As Augustine puts it in his Confessions, the infans does not learn to talk by 
imitating its parents; it is drawn into conversation by its heart ‘with gruntings, varieties 
of voices, and various motions.’37 It is the nexus amoris, the ‘bond of love’ that makes 
the infant fall in love with its ‘narcissistic’ mirror image; and it is the same bond that 
provokes the metamorphosis into a ‘boy’ as soon as the infant falls in love with a reality 
that transcends the virtual space of mirroring effects (in the above key passage 
Augustine does not differentiate between boys and girls).38  
 
In De visione dei this nexus is associated with the irresistible erotic attraction of the 
iconic gaze that arouses our desire for the vision of God. The desire of our heart makes 
us aware that we are surrounded by signposts that point beyond themselves. The visible 
world is literally saturated with traces of an invisible reality that attracts our attention. 
                                                 
 
37  Non enim eram infans, qui non farer, sed iam puer loquens eram. Et memini hoc, et unde loqui 
didiceram, post adverti. Non enim docebant me maiores homines praebens mihi verba (…) sed ego ipse 
mente, quam dedisti mihi, deus meus, cum gemitibus et vocibus variis et variis membrorum motibus edere 
vellem sensa cordis meis. Aurelius Augustinus, Confessiones / Bekenntnisse. Lat.-dt. übers. und erl. von J. 
Bernhard (München: Kösel 1955), I 8,13.  
38  See also Wolf, Schleier und Spiegel, 258: „Nur geschieht der amplexus hier nicht durch ars, 
sondern durch den nexus amoris, und darin ist auch die Selbstliebe des Menschen aufgehoben, weil sie im 
cusanischen Sinne Gottesliebe bedeutet.“  
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This explains why Cusa emphasises in De visione dei so firmly the erotic attraction of 
the all seeing gaze:  
You draw (trahis) us unto Yourself by every possible means of drawing (trahendi 
modo) by which a free rational creature can be drawn (trahi potest) (c. 15 n. 66,1-4; 
Hp n. 70). 
 
God ‘looks’ at me as if he was nothing but my mirror image, and this is attractive. But 
he is looking in the same unique manner at everyone else; and it is impossible to 
integrate this phenomenon in the framework of my narcissistic world. Instead, it shows 
me that I am not in control of the space of my visual perception. As soon as I listen to 
someone, who is looking at a shared focus of attention from a different viewpoint, I start 
to appreciate that something is invisible to me.  
 
The emergence of this blind spot marks the transition from a narcissistic scenario to a 
social scenario; and it is motivated by the desire for the invisible creator of the visible 
world, who draws us into himself ‘by every possible means of drawing’. However, 
modern ‘intersubjective’ accounts of the human language acquisition are not barred 
from appreciating this erotic dimension of human perception. This again becomes most 
evident in Jacques Lacan’s account of intersubjectivity.39  
                                                 
 
39  Cf. Jacques Lacan, Les quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse (1964). Le séminaire, 
livre XI. Ed. by Jacques Alain Miller (Paris: Éditions du Seuil 1973), 113-273. 
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7. The Unmasking of Alberti’s “Narcissus” in Post-modernity 
Lacan argues that as soon as the infant learns to talk with and listen to others, it 
becomes trapped in the insatiable dynamics of human desire. Where he differs from 
Cusa is that the dynamics of this desire is, according to Lacan’s reflexive approach, not 
mediated by a natural desire for the vision of God. Similar to René Girard’s more 
empirically-oriented concept of mimetic desire, it is rather borrowed from other people; 
or more precisely, it is mediated by the desire of the other – in the double sense of this 
genitive. Our desire for the other is always also a desire for what the other desires. In 
contrast to Cusa, the dynamic of human desire is are not rooted in a teleological 
dynamics of nature; it is the upshot of the reflexive dynamics of social interactions: I 
desire what the others desire (e.g. to see what the other sees) because I believe that the 
others believe me to desire what they desire.  
 
This explains, from a Lacanian point of view, why we prefer to attend full cinemas and 
not empty ones: the full cinema is more desirable than the empty one because it 
confirms my belief that the others believe me to believe what they believe; though some 
people might prefer to attend empty cinemas because they believe the others believe 
them to be unbelievers of course!40 Post-modern talent shows like The X Factor, that are 
designed to reveal the inscrutable ‘something’ that makes a singer a ‘star’, are arguably 
                                                 
 
40  Cf. also Michel de Certeau, "What We Do When We Believe". In: Marshall Blonsky (Ed.), On 
Signs (Baltimore: Blackwell 1985), 193-202. 
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built on this reflexive principle. Lacan’s logic of desire provides, as it were, the first 
theoretical account of the fact that the invisible community of Simon Cowell’s viewers 
tends to believe that others believe them to believe what Simon Cowell believes them to 
believe when they watch The X Factor! 
The crunch question raised by this socially expanded logic of mirroring might be posed 
as follows: What makes us believe that self-referential loops of ‘intersubjective’ 
communication are more than a self-deceptive play with mirror effects that keep us 
happy until the hollowness of human desire can no longer be denied? Is Augustine’s 
amplexus amoris (embrace of love) any more than the epiphenomenon of a socially 
extended mirror? 
8. Cusa’s Alternative Account of the Social Space 
Cusa’s answer to the above question builds on a sophisticated account of the interplay 
between heterogeneous sensory faculties, and considerations of the impact of habits of 
faith and belief on our sensory perception.41 In contrast, Lacan builds on a kind of 
‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ that emphasises, in accordance with the late writings of 
                                                 
 
41  I have reconstructed Cusa’s holistic gnoseology in part III of my forthcoming book (see Fn. 1), 
and contrasted it there from the late medieval modularisation of sensual, cognitive and voluntative 
faculties. 
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Sigmund Freud, the destructive sides of our narcissistic self-regard.42 Consequently 
Lacan treats our poetic ability to link and combine information across sensory 
modalities as part of an elaborate, albeit creative, strategy of self-deception that is 
derived from more elementary dynamics of mimetic rivalry. Given this alternative, our 
answer to the question of whether Augustine’s loving desire is only an epiphenomenon 
arguably depends on what we consider to be more elementary: the ambiguity of an 
undetermined scenario of drives that can only be determined via a socially mediated 
processes of mirroring in which good and evil tend to neutralize each other; or the 
poetic guidance of narratives and liturgical practices that enable us to disentangle the 
dynamic of our desires without getting disorientated in the ambiguity of an ultimately 
pointless zero-sum game.43 
 
                                                 
 
42  Cf. Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book VII. The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 
1959-1960 (London: Tavistock/Routledge 1992), ch 7-12; Sigmund Freud, Jenseits des Lustprinzips 
(Frankfurt/M.: 1975); and Sigmund Freud, Das Unbehagen in der Kultur (Frankfurt/M.: 1974). 
43  Cf. Johannes Hoff, "Mystagogy Beyond Onto-theology. Looking back to Post-modernity with 
Nicholas of Cusa". In: Arne Moritz (Ed.), A Companion to Nicholas of Cusa (Leiden: Brill 2013); Hoff, 
The Analogical Turn (passim); and Johannes Hoff, "Das Paradox des Glaubens und der Holzweg 
moderner Entscheidungslogik. Kierkegaards Lektüre von Genesis 22 und ihre Wirkungsgeschichte von 
Heidegger bis Derrida und darüber hinaus". In: Helmut Hoping; Julia Knop; Thomas Böhm (Ed.), Die 
Bindung Isaaks. Stimme, Schrift, Bild (Paderborn: Schöningh 2009), 238-258. 
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Another way of approaching this issue is to investigate, along with Lacan’s disciple 
Michel de Certeau, how Cusa deals with the disturbing dimensions of the dark attraction 
of his all-seeing gaze. At certain points we can indeed detect an unsettling similarity 
between Cusa’s attempt to deconstruct Alberti’s narcissism and Lacan’s deconstruction 
of Descartes’ concept of subjective autonomy.44 Cusa pays attention to such a sensitive 
point when he notes in his chapter on Jesus in De visione Dei that the faithful, who feel 
themselves ‘attracted’45 by the paradoxical presence of the creator in a visible creature, 
will appear as mad in the eyes of the wise: stultitiam asserunt id credere possible (c. 21, 
n. 91, 7; Hp n. 92).  
 
Christological accounts of the madness of faith have been part of the Christian tradition 
since as early as Saint Paul. But what do such accounts contribute to phenomenological 
or ontological debates on human perception? Certeau provides us with an answer to this 
question when he relates the stultitia (madness) in Christ to the transient bewilderment 
that arises when the monks discover that the all-seeing gaze, which is looking at 
everyone as if it were looking at no one else, is looking simultaneously at everyone else. 
The monks in this situation are not only required to listen to their confrères and to 
believe what the other monks say. They are also called to assent to what no one can, as 
long as he considers himself an autonomous ‘subject’: they are required to participate in 
                                                 
 
44  Certeau, "The Gaze", 34f. 
45  Sis creator pariter et creatura, attrahens pariter et attractum, c. 21 n. 97,7-8. 
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an act of joint attention; and to take something for granted that cannot be assured 
through the evidences of visual perceptions alone.  
 
Our ability to appreciate this phenomenon is mediated by Jesus Christ, Cusa maintains, 
and by the theological promise that his remaining presence will enable every believer to 
perceive the invisible Son of God in the visible face of his neighbour. However, Cusa’s 
solution to this problem provokes the modern suspicion that he takes this step too 
quickly. To be sure, every Christian since Saint Paul knows that the decision to believe 
is madness, and the above quotation demonstrates that Cusa was familiar with this 
tradition. But the fine line that separates the madness of faith from its destination has 
grown into a nihilistic abyss in the five centuries that followed Cusa’s late medieval 
experiment. 
9. The Return of the Invisible in Late Modernity 
This abyss becomes most evident if we compare Cusa’s account of the invisible with 
the modern re-emergence of the invisible in the wake of Paul Cezanne’s deconstruction 
of the linear perspective. Certeau refers to Lacan’s contributions to the related 
phenomenological debates, which build in turn on Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s 
groundbreaking publications about Cézanne, as well as his Phenomenology of 
Perception.46 Merleau-Ponty had demonstrated that Alberti’s linear perspective is not as 
                                                 
 
46  Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge 1989). 
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realistic as it purports to be; and that, in fact, Cézanne’s paintings actually do more 
justice to our perception, though they appear at first glance to be distorted: ‘when our 
eye runs over a large surface, the images it successively receives are taken from 
different points of view, and the whole surface is warped’.47 Similar to Picasso’s 
cubistic paintings, the paintings of Cézanne and his successors appear ‘warped’ because 
they do justice to the temporal dynamics of human perception. As Merleau-Ponty puts 
it:  
Perspectival distortions are no longer visible in their own right but rather 
contribute, as they do in natural vision, to the impression of an emerging order, of 
an object in the act of appearing, organizing itself before our eyes.48 
 
This latter concept of realism is more consistent with Cusa’s ontologically realist 
account of human perception than the representationalist accounts that emerged in the 
wake of Roger Bacon, Alberti, Descartes, and Locke. Similar to Cezanne, Cusa treats 
the emergence of visual perception as the upshot of an attunement between the intention 
of colours that, so to speak, ‘address’ the viewer, and the attention of the viewer who 
                                                 
 
47  Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Cèzanne's Doubt". In: Galen A. Johnson; Michael B. Smith (Ed.), The 
Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader. Philosophy and Painting (Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press 
1993), 59-75, 64. 
48  Merleau-Ponty, "Cèzanne's Doubt", 65. 
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responds to this ‘address’.49 But how does this non-representationalist account of vision 
relate to Cusa’s account of the visibility of the invisible in De visione Dei? 
 
Up to a certain point, the all-seeing gaze of Cusa’s icon only makes explicit what 
characterises every object of human perception: that things have the power to attract my 
attention; they arouse my desire because ‘they are looking at me’. Numerous 
contemporary publications confirm this account of visual perception, from Merleau-
Ponty (‘the things attract my look‘),50 James Elkins (‘The object stares back’),51 to 
George Didi-Huberman (‘What we see is looking at us’).52 But Cusa’s experiment in 
fact, goes deeper than the level of such contemporary debates on human perception. 
This becomes evident if we clearly distinguish Cusa’s deconstruction of Alberti’s 
representationalist concept of the linear perspective from Lacan’s deconstruction of the 
related, modern concepts of subjectivity and space, since Lacan’s deconstruction is in 
essential aspects still attached to Alberti’s concept of space.  
                                                 
 
49  Visio ex intentione coloris et attentione videntis oritur. Compendium c. 13 n. 41,6-9; see also De 
apice theoriae, n. 7. 
50  Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible. Ed. by Claude Lefort. Transl. by 
Alphonso Lingis (Evanston Ill.: Northwestern University Press 1968), p. 76.  
51  James Elkins, The Object Stares Back. On the Nature of Seeing (Orland, Fla: Harcourt 1997). 
52  Georges Didi-Huberman, Was wir sehen blickt uns an. Zur Metapsychologie des Bildes. Übers. 
von M. Sedlaczek (München: 1999) (own translation). 
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10. Paranoiac Features of the Late-Modern Invisible  
Alberti reduced the position of the viewer to an inextended eye point that is reflected by 
the vanishing point in the painting (see the above diagram). Descartes’ distinction 
between extended (res extensa) and non-extended substances (res cogitans) built on this 
representationalist tradition, but moved the non-extended eye point behind the image; as 
in the infamous drawing in his Optics, where the viewer hides behind the retina of a big 
oxen eye. Lacan harked back to Alberti and deviated from the later only insofar as he 
unmasked the truth of the Cartesian subject to be nothing more than the upshot of a 
narcissistic illusion; and this means, by implication, that the alter ego of face-to-face 
encounters is an illusion as well. According to this approach, the secret of his or her face 
is nothing but the upshot of a self-deceptive ‘transference relation’.53 
 
What do I see when I look at the gaze of a human face, or at the gaze of a portrait? 
According to Alberti and Descartes, I do not see two eyes. Strictly speaking there is 
only one eye, since the secret of the gaze is hidden in the eye point at the surface or (in 
the case of Descartes) the inextended soul beneath the (sur-)face. But according to 
Lacan the secret of this eye is nothing but an illusion: it is the by-product of our 
                                                 
 
53  Cf. Jacques Lacan, Le séminaire, livre VIII: Le transfert (Paris: Seuil 1991). 
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narcissistic obsession with mirror images. The face is a mere camouflage; the truth 
behind it is, as Lacan puts it in his Séminaire XI, nothing but ‘faeces’ – a heap of shit.54  
 
Lacan’s deconstruction of the Cartesian concept of subjectivity confronted his disciples 
with an abyss of desire that recalled the nightmares of his ‘paranoiac critical’55 surrealist 
contemporaries. In the quotation, prefixed to his essay on Cusa, Certeau quotes a 
sentence of Octavio Paz’ Pasado en claro that goes to the heart of these nightmares:  
I am inside the eye: the well where from the beginning a child is falling, the well 
where I count the time I took to fall from the beginning.  
Lacan’s contemporary Alfred Hitchcock provided the cinematographic counterpart to 
this poetic nightmare when he staged one of the best-known scenes of Western film 
history, the iconic, in terms of our late-modern imagination, ‘Shower Scene’ of his 
thriller Psycho.56 In the first sequence of this scene we see the face of the unsuspecting 
victim Marion (played by Janet Leigh) taking a shower in her motel room. A few shots 
later we see through Marion’s shower curtain the shadow of the disturbed owner of the 
motel, Norman Bates (played by Antony Perkins), entering the bathroom. In the next 
                                                 
 
54  Cf. Lacan, Les quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse (1964), 92-97. 
55  Cf. Briony Fer, "Surrealism, Myth and Psychoanalysis". In: Briony Fer; David Batchelor; Paul 
Wood (Ed.), Realism, Rationalism, Surrealism. Art Between the Wars (New Haven etc.: Yale University 
Press etc. 1993), 170-249, 218-221. 
56  The psychology of “The Gaze“ is an on-going topic in Hitchcock’s films. Cf. Slavoj Žižek (Ed.), 
Ein Triumph des Blicks über das Auge. Psychoanalyse bei Hitchcock (Wien : 21998), pp.193-263 
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shot, the curtain is suddenly ripped aside, though it is still not possible to identify the 
face of the perpetrator. This is followed by a sequence of cubistic point-of-view shots 
that demonstrates to us that we have lost control of our visual faculties. After the 
enigmatic killer has left the room, the shower scene ends by revealing the truth about 
the victim – announced by her tearing down the curtain – as we see the blood of Marion 
sucked into the whirlpool of the drainage pipe, which becomes eventually superimposed 
by a single eye spinning round in the opposite direction. Lacan used to recall that, 
according to Freud, dream images of a drainage pipes are nothing but a symbol for the 
shit that hides behind the screen of our narcissistic illusions. The downside of Marion’s 
face is exactly that, faeces.  
11. Cusa’s Alternative Account of the Invisible  
This disturbing revelation leads us back to our starting point: in Lacan and Hitchcock 
the ‘bond of love’, that makes human faces appear as attractive, is nothing but an 
epiphenomenon of mirror effects that hide the drain beneath the surface. However, if a 
concept of rationality, that is supposed to be realistic, leads to the conclusion that what 
we consider reality to be is nothing but an illusion, would it then not be more reasonable 
to question the non-realist prejudices that make this appear conclusive? Cusa took this 
step at the very moment when the narcissistic age of modern science and culture was 
about to emerge, and this is why the late Certeau started to reconstruct Cusa’s liturgical 
concept of space when he tried to deconstruct the philosophical nightmares of his 
psychoanalytic teacher.  
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Lacan’s deconstruction of the Cartesian concepts of space and autonomy built on the 
‘art as religion’ tradition of modernity, following painters like Picasso, whose work 
strongly resonated with the cinematic world of Hitchcock. On the one hand, this artistic 
tradition deconstructed Alberti’s proto-Cartesian central perspective, based as it was on 
the distortion and multiplication of perspectives; but on the other hand, it remained, like 
Lacan, attached to this tradition. This becomes evident if we recall Alberti’s most 
important innovation: the interpretation of the painting as a representative window that 
cuts through the visual pyramid. As outlined above, Alberti’s window-model requires us 
to adopt a fixed position in relation to the physical picture-frame in the real space of our 
social life to ensure that our real position coincides with the illusionary position of the 
eye point in the imaginary space of the image. As soon as we have got this right we start 
to be immersed in the virtual space of the screen – as I do when I watch television and 
forget about my sitting room. In the case of paintings like Picasso’s Girl before a mirror 
(1932), or films like Psycho (1960) we are still trapped in the virtual reality of this 
illusionary space. The only difference is that they re-introduce the invisible into the 
visible space of the image by multiplying and distorting the positions of the geometrical 
eye point.  
 
When Hitchcock uses ‘point of view shots’ in order to show what a character is looking 
at without revealing who the character is, he too builds on Picasso’s multiplication of 
perspectives. In both cases, in the paintings and the films, we are confronted with a 
rhetorical strategy of visualisation that is at least in one respect comparable with Cusa’s 
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experiment: if you want to show me the invisible you have to show me that what 
appears to be real from my limited point of view is simultaneously seen from a 
viewpoint that is inaccessible to me. However, and unlike Cusa, in Picasso and 
Hitchcock these pluralised viewpoints are no longer associated with the corporeal 
presence of visible faces. Rather like Alberti’s eye point they are only re-presented 
through the reflexive medium of the picture, cinema, or TV-screen. Our viewer’s 
position goes (like in Cusa) off the rails but we are (unlike in Cusa) not permitted to get 
a foothold in the social space of face-to-face encounters.  
 
In contrast to Alberti, the invisible becomes again visible in late-modernity; but now the 
lack of a social space undermines the attitude of trust that characterized the liturgical 
space of pre-modern thinkers like Cusa and Van Eyck. The invisible appears, but now 
only as virtuality, viz. as a paranoid construct that at the same time negates and obscures 
its roots in the actuality of real time encounters. In contrast to this representationalist 
focus on ‘virtual realities’, Cusa’s vera icona is more comparable with a readymade in 
the style of Marcel Duchamp’s landmark urinal “Fountain“ of 1917 that evoked tactile 
and olfactory associations. As George Didi-Huberman has demonstrated, starting from 
this prototypical example, artistic objects like these have more in common with 
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medieval contact relics than with an image in which we can immerse ourselves.57 They 
recover the situated, real time aspects of our perception.  
 
Cusa does something similar when he focuses on an image relic that can be touched and 
kissed: the gaze of his vera icona is not associated with a virtual space but with an 
actual physical object, while its unfathomable attraction is due to the multiplication of 
perspectives in the social space of the monks, and not to the representative 
multiplication of perspectives within the virtual space of an image. Unlike Picasso, 
Hitchcock and Lacan, the visibility of the invisible is in Cusa associated with visible 
bodies, and our poetic ability to ‘see’ what we can hear, smell and touch. I can perceive 
the invisible in other faces due to a poetic sensitivity that is rooted in an attitude of trust. 
And it is would be inappropriate if we tried to demonstrate that this is possible based on 
phenomenological analyses of phenomena of ‘givenness’, as the post-Cartesian tradition 
of modern philosophy might mislead us to do. It suffices to deconstruct the counter-
intuitive, representationalist presuppositions of philosophical or ‘scientific’ theories that 
undermine our ability to trust in the primordial realism of our everyday perception – 
“unless he believed, he would not understand”, says Nicholas of Cusa (n. 3,22f.; Hp n. 
4).58 
                                                 
 
57  Cf. Georges Didi-Huberman, Ähnlichkeit und Berührung. Archäologie, Anachronismus und 
Modernität des Abdrucks (Köln: Dumont 1999). 
58  Cf. Hoff, "Mystagogy Beyond Onto-theology" (forthcoming); and above Fn. 34. 
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In the 15th century Alberti distanced himself from Cennino Cennini when he insisted 
that the invisible is not the business of painters; five hundred years later the invisible 
attracted the attention of painters and artists more than ever before. But the late modern 
revival of the invisible was still focused on Alberti’s representationalist imaginary 
space, and this prevented it from regaining its social and liturgical significance. It is 
precisely this, however, which Cusa’s experimental introduction to Pseudo-Dionysius’ 
Mystical Theology offers us – a realist awareness of the social and liturgical dynamic 
that underpins the invisible in a medieval context and which thus presents a challenge to 
the basic assumptions of our post-Cartesian way of thinking.  
